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SANCTIONING THE AMBULANCE CHASER
Anita Bernstein*
Great moments in American legal history ensued when
"prominent lawyers, without the prior invitation of the client,
approached a person in legal trouble and offered their services."'
Among these clients "in legal trouble" were familiar names from past
centuries: Dred Scott, John Peter Zenger, Aaron Burr.2 Sometimes
those who did the soliciting were famous too, notably the man who
went on to become an especially great president of the United States,
a lawyer who dived "unabashedly" into solicitation.3
How far Abraham Lincoln would go to chase a new client
emerges in the backstory of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. County
of McLean,' in which the eminent litigator convinced the state
supreme court that a county in central Illinois could not tax railroad-
owned property. Lincoln must have been keen to speak for a client
in the dispute. Taking the vulgarism "working both sides of the
street" one step further, he pursued three prospects. The first
prospect was the one he won: Lincoln solicited the Illinois Central
Railroad's business by writing a letter to its general counsel. He also
initiated preliminary discussions with McLean officials about
representing the county against the railroad. Earlier he had sought
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1. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 786 (Hornbook Series student ed.
1986).
2. See In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467, 475-76 (D. Md. 1934) (summarizing cases).
3. WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 785-86.
4. 17 I11. 291 (1855).
1545
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.41:1545
yet another client on the other side, writing to the clerk of nearby
Champaign County with an offer to represent it, along with McLean
County, in its dispute with Illinois Central, the client he later
represented. Three sides of the street: the winning side, the losing
side, and a side that stayed out of the fray.'
Lincoln's overtures violated no rules: the organized American
bar did not classify solicitation as among the central improprieties of
the profession until the 1908 publication of the American Bar
Association's Canons of Professional Ethics ("Canons").6 The ABA
perpetuated this stance in its later compilations, the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Model Code")7 and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Model Rules").8 If the Canons or their ABA-
authored successors had been governing law, the correspondence
between Lincoln and McLean County officials alone, to say nothing
of his solicitations on the other side of the street, would have sufficed
to get Honest Abe disbarred "in probably any state of the Union." 9
Nineteenth-century lawyers who disapproved of solicitation,
however, saw the practice as bad etiquette rather than a breach of
professional responsibility."0 Today, those who write and enforce the
law of professional conduct express condemnation of solicitation
initiatives like Lincoln's through blackletter disciplinary rules on the
books in every American jurisdiction.
The typical current prohibition, following Model Rule 7.3,
makes lawyers subject to discipline if they communicate with
individuals in real time-in person, on the telephone, or by other
electronic media-with an offer to represent them, if a significant
motive behind the overture is pecuniary gain. All jurisdictions
exempt at least some targets from the ban: lawyers may solicit
employment from persons with whom they already have certain
professional or personal relationships. Two jurisdictions, Virginia
and the District of Columbia, liberalize the ban by making
5. This solicitation tale is told in Robert F. Boden, Five Years After Bates: Lawyer
Advertising in Legal and Ethical Perspective, 65 MARQ. L. REv. 547, 547-48 (1982).
6. ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS (1908).
7. Adopted in 1969, effective January 1, 1970.
8. Replacing the Model Code in 1983.
9. Boden, supra note 5, at 548.
10. HENRYS. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 211 n.6 (1953).
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permission the norm and prohibition the exception." Their stated
permissiveness is a distinct minority position. Solicitation not done
in real time-that is, letters to prospective clients, of the kind
Lincoln wrote when trying to be retained both by and against the
Illinois Central Railroad-was prohibited in the first version of the
Model Rules too, but the ABA had to withdraw that ban after the
Supreme Court determined that written solicitation was commercial
speech protected by the First Amendment. 2 The Model Rules
continue to subject written solicitation to close regulatory attention.3
Ethics opinions from the ABA and state bar authorities buttress the
blackletter law, entrenching disapproval of solicitation into state-
level regulation. 4
This mixed view of the practice-that is, the association of it
with idealism and "pecuniary gain,"' 5 bravery and bottom-feeding,
the rescue of vulnerable clients and the manipulation of vulnerable
clients-suggests that solicitation is sanctioned, in the two
contradictory meanings of this term. From the possibility that
"sanctioning" means both disapproval and condonation, normative
and descriptive questions arise. The normative question asks
whether solicitation is a bad thing. On the descriptive side, one
might wonder whether the bar in fact reacts to solicitation as a bad
thing beyond its rule books, at the level of enforcement.
Bringing benefits to American civil justice as it does, solicitation
cannot be entirely blameworthy. Commentators in law reviews (the
majority of whom defend solicitation, although usually without
enthusiasm) have pointed out that changing disciplinary law to
permit the initiation of employment-seeking contact with laypeople
whom the soliciting lawyer does not already know would convey
information to these prospective clients,'6 empower the downtrodden
11. See infra Part 1.
12. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D.
SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 438-39 (2007).
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(b)-(c) (2007).
14. Victor P. Filippini, Jr., Note, Soliciting Sophisticates: A Modest Proposal for Attorney
Solicitation, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585, 587 (1983).
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a).
16. See Richard L. Abel, How the Plaintiffs' Bar Bars Plaintiffs, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
345, 358 (2006-2007); Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J.
443, 462 (1987) [hereinafter Abel, Too Few Claims]; Evan R. Levy, Note, Edenfield v. Bane: In-
Person Solicitation by Professionals Revisited-What Makes Lawyers Different?, 58 ALB. L.
REV. 261, 280 (1994).
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injured masses, 7 enhance price competition (and probably also lower
the cost of legal services), 8 and narrow a real gap between
disadvantaged lawyers and their better-off counterparts, who are now
free to solicit away at their country clubs or from a large repeat-
business client base. 9 Elementary analysis of this market for legal
services reveals the potential gains. Moreover, state actors like the
bar cannot suppress this commercial speech without a reason. Bans
on solicitation, which clash with a prevailing acclaim for
entrepreneurial hustle" and the American libertarian ideology that
sees "no harm in asking,"'" demand justification as constraints on
expression.2
The ABA has sited this justification in a lawyer's power to
persuade. In its comments to Model Rule 7.3, it notes that the
vulnerability of a layperson in need of legal services and the
powerful words of a professional trained to argue effectively
combine to create "a potential for abuse. 23 Without the preexisting
relationship that presumably mitigates this potential, in-person
contact "is fraught with the possibility of undue influence,
intimidation, and over-reaching."24  Advertising and written
solicitations at least have the virtue of forcing the lawyer to commit
to a particular text that can be reviewed later if challenged.25 They
17. See Deborah L. Rhode, Solicitation, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 317, 324-25 (1986) (referring to
the Bhopal experience).
18. WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 787-88; Fred S. McChesney, Commercial Speech in the
Professions: The Supreme Court's Unanswered Questions and Questionable Answers, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 44, 58-59 (1985).
19. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468-77 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring);
McChesney, supra note 18, at 89-90 (reviewing condoned "indirect" means of soliciting new
work); see also David B. Wilkins, Class Not Race in Legal Ethics: Or Why Hierarchy Makes
Strange Bedfellows, 20 L. & HIST. REV. 147, 148 (2002) (arguing that elite lawyers can be seen
as eschewing solicitation only if one believes "that the restrictions in the ethics codes" do not
apply to these lawyers).
20. Anita Bernstein, The Enterprise of Liability, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 27, 32-33 (2004).
21. Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L.
REV. 1033, 1055 (1936).
22. H.L.A. Hart tried, unsuccessfully in the view of one feminist philosopher, to defend the
choice made in Britain to criminalize a polite, words-only offer from a prostitute to a man on a
street. Karen Busby, The Maleness of Legal Language, 18 MANITOBA L.J. 191, 197 (1989)
(quoting H.L.A Hart, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 45 (1963)).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt. 1 (2007).
24. Id.
25. Id. cmt. 3.
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also give the client time to think, away from silver-tongued
advocacy.26
Good or bad, then? Factual material would inform the
normative debate. Public records of lawyer discipline, though
notoriously incomplete and opaque, would shed some light on
solicitation as a disciplinary offense. The most basic questions about
the prohibition still languish unexplored. 27 How does the bar enforce
its ban? Which bad behaviors by lawyers does enforcement expose?
Investigating these questions, I have had in mind a personal
injury lawyer and the trope of an ambulance chaser. This stereotype
can, of course, be severed from solicitation: any lawyer able to seek
work from a paying client can violate a ban. Surveying solicitation
in the aftermath of the Bhopal disaster, Deborah Rhode identified
personal injury, criminal defense, and public interest practice as the
occupational subsets that rely most on "personal overtures to
previously unknown parties ... ."28 Of these three, public interest
clients may now be solicited without penalty,29 and criminal defense,
performed by a small and specialized cohort, can be excluded from
the larger category of work that lawyers do for clients who enter the
legal system by choice.3" Prohibiting live in-person overtures to
prospective clients thus presses especially hard on lawyers who
specialize in, or wish to prosecute, personal injury claims made on
behalf of plaintiffs. Like the prohibition of solicitation, the sobriquet
of ambulance chaser is sometimes applied to lawyers who seek other
kinds of work but fits personal injury practice most closely.3' As the
26. Id. cmt. 2.
27. See Rhode, supra note 17, at 325 (lamenting the "absence of systematic data on the
frequency and consequences of solicitation").
28. Rhode, supra note 17, at 326.
29. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422-25, 439 (1978).
30. See generally Ficker v. Curran, 950 F. Supp. 123, 126 (D. Md. 1996) (striking down a
thirty-day ban on soliciting criminal defense clients notwithstanding the Supreme Court's
approval of such a ban for personal injury clients, because the criminal-solicitation prohibition at
issue presented "entirely different issues and interests than [did] a similar ban on solicitation of
personal injury plaintiffs"). "The profession is unconcerned with solicitation of criminal
defendants for two reasons: there isn't much money to be made from it; and most criminal
defense is done by salaried PDs." E-mail from Richard L. Abel, Michael J. Connell Professor of
Law, to author (Jan. 22, 2008, 11:51 a.m.) (on file with author) [hereinafter Abel Message].
31. The famed personal injury lawyer who called himself the King of Torts reveled in this
phrase. "I'm not an ambulance chaser," he once said, according to his obituary; "I'm usually
there before the ambulance." Angela Townsend, Melvin Belli, "King of Torts, " Dies, USA
TODAY, July 10, 1996, at 3A.
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Second Circuit noted when it approved a defamation claim brought
by a lawyer who specialized in employment discrimination litigation,
the offending term evokes an image of a personal injury advocate
and implicitly makes an accusation of improper solicitation.32 A
survey of the solicitation ban as enforced and understood is
especially pertinent to the personal injury bar, and the frontiers of
tort law that this Symposium examines.
My investigation of the ban begins with what it purports to
prohibit. I review the Model Rules prohibition, the District of
Columbia and Virginia variations that liberalize it, federal-level bans,
and the ABA's rationale for the prohibition in Part I, "Sanctioning =
Disapproving." The next Part considers sanctioning as condoning:
Part II looks at the extraordinarily low level of enforcement of this
prohibition.33 Part III supposes that a prohibition that is emphatically
written and reaffirmed in blackletter yet only seldom enforced must
be "expressive," an academic adjective that I use here to mean that
the prohibition serves to lay down contrasting approved and
disapproved ways to represent paying clients.34 The ban deters
solicitation through norm-pressure rather than enforcement.
Declaring solicitation a lapse of professional conduct and a
disciplinary offense while doing almost nothing to punish it may be a
compromise, an attempt by the bar to recognize both the sunny
idealism/heroism/client-rescue aspect of solicitation and its dark
squalor/"pecuniary gain"/client-manipulation side.35  If so, the
compromise is rotten and should be abandoned, in the spirit of
cleansing that caused the ABA in the Model Rules to throw out the
32. Flamm v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women, 201 F.3d 144, 151-53 (2d Cir. 2000). Older case
law also uses this term to refer to a personal injury lawyer who solicits clients.; Smallberg v. State
Bar, 297 P. 916, 917, 919-20 (Cal. 1931); In re Kelly, 243 F. 696, 704-05 (D. Mont. 1917); Edler
v. Frazier, 156 N.W. 182, 185 (Iowa 1916).
33. A leading work in this nascent genre of empirical studies of underenforced professional-
responsibility rules is Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody's Watching: Legal
Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV.
971 (2002).
34. "The standard sociological explanation is symbolic politics: an ethical norm is advanced
as a claim to social superiority." Abel Message, supra note 30.
35. Cf LORI B. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND
SOLICITATION 67 (1980) ("The bar's traditional aversion to solicitation in theory, coupled with an
inability to define what is actually meant by the term, has made the regulation of solicitation one
of the most controversial issues facing the profession today.") (emphasis in original); Zacharias,
supra note 33, at 1004 (observing that "the decision to adopt but not to enforce the advertising
rules may reflect a tacit compromise").
1550
Summer 2008]SANCTIONING THE AMBULANCE CHASER
how-do-we-look prohibitions strewn through the Model Code-or, if
one prefers, the doctrine of desuetude, by which a prohibition
becomes eroded and then abrogated as a consequence of
nonenforcement.36 A ban on solicitation, like every other modem
rule of professional responsibility, ought to be cogent and
transparent. Modifying this rule to emulate its liberal District of
Columbia and Virginia variations would continue to honor client
protection while making the restriction more intelligible to those
affected by its constraint.
I. SANCTIONING = DISAPPROVING
The ABA, through its Model Rules, encourages states to codify
a prohibition of solicitation. On the books with modifications in the
overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions, the Model Rules
provide that "[a] lawyer shall not by in-person, live telephone or real-
time electronic contact solicit professional employment from a
prospective client when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing
so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain,"37 unless one of a few exceptions
apply: lawyers may solicit employment from family members, close
friends, fellow lawyers, and persons with whom they already have
professional relationships.
Rejecting the categorical ban on spoken or real-time overtures to
strangers whenever the representation could transfer pecuniary value
to the lawyer, Virginia and the District of Columbia prohibit
solicitation only where one of three conditions is present: (1) the
lawyer knows that the target could not exercise reasonable judgment;
(2) the target has made known a desire not to receive communication
from the lawyer; or (3) the lawyer's overture involves coercion or
duress. 38 This version of the ban resembles the ABA's Discussion
Draft of 1980, 39 an experiment in permissiveness that had not been
36. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 148 (2d ed. 1962) (claiming that statutes can lose their effect "with the tacit
consent of all") (quoting JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 190
(2d ed. 1921)).
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2007).
38. VIRGINIA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2007); DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (b)(1) (2007).
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 9.3 (Discussion Draft 1980), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/kutak 1 -80.pdf:
(a) A lawyer shall not initiate contact with a prospective client if:
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attempted in the predecessor Model Code and one that the ABA
abandoned the following year in its 1981 Draft.4
The Model Rules and the large majority of jurisdictions
condemn solicitation for being crucially different from advertising,
the other time-honored method for lawyers to gain new clients whom
they cannot reach through networks, introductions, and preexisting
relationships. Regulators may not like the looks of advertising, but
for the last few decades they have been tolerating it. Most
practitioners today are too young to remember the ban on "self-
laudation," a rule of enforced gentility that held firm until the
Supreme Court held that lawyers have a First Amendment right to
advertise.4 This development in commercial-speech doctrine forced
the profession to yield on advertising to a degree that it has never
budged on solicitation. One marketing strategy located midway
between the two--direct mailings sent to persons believed to be in
need of legal services-has vexed the Supreme Court, which in 1988
found that a ban on such mailings infringed a free-speech right,42 but
seven years later concluded in Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., a 5-4
decision containing a trenchant dissent, that a state could force
lawyers to let thirty days pass after an accident before writing to
prospective clients offering to represent them. 3
The ban continues unabated, with extensions rather than
liberalizations following the Went for It decision. Fifteen states have
joined Florida in prohibiting lawyers from writing to prospective
personal injury clients until a month or more elapses after the
accident in question. Restrictions vary: some states impose a waiting
period only in wrongful death cases; some only for approaches
(1) the lawyer reasonably should know that the physical, emotional, or mental
state of the person solicited is such that the person could not exercise reasonable
judgment in employing a lawyer;
(2) the person solicited has made known a desire not to receive communication
from the lawyer; or
(3) the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or harassment.
40. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 12, at 607 (2007) (reprinting both drafts of the Model
Rules and Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 2-104).
41. See In re RMJ, 455 U.S. 191, 206-07 (1982); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
350, 384 (1977). On self-laudation, see ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS 672 (1908)
(prohibiting it); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (1980) (prohibiting any
public communication that contains a "self-laudatory" statement).
42. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 479-80 (1988).
43. 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995).
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following a mass disaster; some increase the wait time. Alabama,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Wyoming all impose a waiting period before certain
personal injury solicitations can commence," and other states have
announced the prospect of their adding such a provision to their
professional-responsibility rules.45 Before these waiting periods were
enacted, one leading professional organization for the plaintiffs' bar,
the American Association of Justice (back when it was called the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America), had already promulgated
a code of conduct that required its members to refrain from
unrequested contacts with injured persons and uninvited visits to
disaster sites.46 Federal law has since 1996 imposed a waiting period
on lawyers before they may solicit clients following an aviation
disaster,47 and prohibits lawyers who practice before the Internal
Revenue Service from committing whatever actions their home
jurisdictions condemn as improper solicitation with respect to their
work before the IRS.45
II. SANCTIONING = CONDONING: ENFORCEMENT 2002-07
A. Solicitation in the Disciplinary Annals
Just over 1.3 million licenses to practice law subject individuals
in the United States to discipline for violating rules of professional
conduct.49 Most of these individuals stay clear of the disciplinarians
44. ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT § 81: 2001-08 (2008); GILLERS
& SIMON, supra note 12, at 439-47. Kentucky adds misdemeanor criminal penalties to the
disciplinary offense of soliciting a client before thirty days elapses. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
2 1A.300 (LexisNexis 2008).
45. Will Hornsby, A Look at the Year to Come: Lawyer Advertising in 2008, LAWYERS
USA, Jan. 28, 2008, at 25.
46. ASS'N OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AM. CODE OF CONDUCT (approved July 31, 1988),
available at
http://ethics.iit.edu/codes/coe/roscoe.pound.amer.trail.lawyers.foundation.code.conduct.html.
47. Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat. 3265
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1136(g)(2) (2000)). An amendment in 2000 extended the
waiting period from 30 to 45 days. The National Transportation Safety Board enforces the ban.
See NTSB Sues Lawyer for Soliciting Accident Victims' Families, AVIATION DAILY, Feb. 13,
1998.
48. 31 C.F.R. § 10.30(a)(2) (2007).
49. ABA Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems (2006),
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/discipline/sold/home.html. For the purpose of looking at
disciplinary enforcement it seems more pertinent to count licenses rather than individuals.
1553
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.41:1545
as they go about their work, but each year several thousand receive a
sanction. It is frustratingly difficult to come up with a more precise
count. Non-public reprimands shrouded in vague aggregations,
"diversionary" responses that remove contrite low-level offenders
from the disciplinary apparatus, and notoriously inadequate reporting
from some jurisdictions suggest that the ABA estimate of 1,903
private and 4,309 public sanctions in 2006, the most recent year
studied, falls very short.50 Let us use this total, approximately 6,200,
as an underestimate of the number of sanctions issued each year.
Given the denominator of 1.3 million, and a sanction rate that
seems to nail about one half of 1 percent of the vulnerable
population, how many sanctions for solicitation might one expect to
see in a given year?5' The exercise in algebra becomes even more
confounded. Initiating "live, in-person" contact with a nonclient to
offer one's legal services is a disciplinary offense in almost every
American jurisdiction,12 as was mentioned, but some state bars are
known for their vigorous enforcement of their disciplinary rules and
others for laxity. Some state bars are reputed to care more than
others about solicitation in particular. 3
Perhaps most confounding to an estimate of how much
solicitation enforcement to expect, disciplinary rules vary in the
proportion of practicing lawyers to whose work they pertain. One
would expect relatively few sanctions for violating state counterparts
to Rule 7.4(d)(1) of the Model Rules,54 a provision that applies only
to lawyers who call themselves specialists, and relatively many for
wider-ranging prohibitions like the rules against neglecting clients
and commingling client property. The records confirm this
50. For elaboration on these difficulties, see Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in
Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 1 & n.2 (2007).
51. The verb "to see" occludes a key problem in reviewing disciplinary practices: the large
fraction of sanctions that are withheld from view. Admonition or private reprimand is only one
of several disciplinary responses that keep the lawyer's name and sanction out of public records.
See ABA Joint Comm. on Prof I Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions R. 2.6
(1992) [hereinafter ABA, Standards], available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/regulation/
standardssanctions.pdf.
52. See supra notes 12-15, 38-41 and accompanying text (noting exceptions of Virginia and
the District of Columbia).
53. Louisiana and Florida have reputations for relatively aggressive enforcement. At the
other end of the range, my research found several states whose rosters of published sanctions of
lawyers in the last five years include zero references to solicitation.
54. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.4(d)(1) (2007).
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prediction.5 A few other rules line up at one extreme or the other,
but most do not. Solicitation seems to fall at the wider-ranging end
of the spectrum. Although some job descriptions give lawyers little
motive or opportunity to solicit anyone, only a rare employer will
forbid the lawyers on its payroll to retain clients on their own
initiative, and the bulk of work for which clients retain counsel gets
done for what the ABA primly calls pecuniary gain. On the offenses
spectrum, solicitation of nonclients with the motive of enhancing
one's own wealth appears relatively tempting and easy to commit.
And so when an administrator with extensive disciplinary
experience inside a large state bar told me, in response to my
question about the sanction rate for solicitation, that a single instance
of discipline in any state during any three-year period would be more
than par, I was surprised.56 He proved right, as I elaborate below.
Perhaps state counterparts to Model Rule 7.3 are violated only very
rarely. Alternatively, this offense might be extraordinarily
underreported. From my review of the disciplinary record, I favor a
third inference: solicitation is condoned.
The well-informed estimate that one instance of discipline in
three years would be a lot in any state's disciplinary annals suggested
to me that reading and considering every account of discipline for
solicitation reported during the last five years, and from there trying
to gauge the state of disciplinary law for this offense, would be a
manageable task. The chief challenge was to locate a full, or nearly
full, set of these published instances. As was mentioned, lawyer
discipline in the United States falls short on transparency: complete
data-sets in this area are elusive as a unicorn. Accordingly, from the
start I could never aspire to generalize about all instances of
discipline for solicitation, just the fraction of them that I had to hope
would be large. I summarize my research design here for any reader
who wonders whether it retrieved enough of the total to support my
main claim: that is, the bar tolerates solicitation.
55. See generally Anita Bernstein, Foreword: What Clients Want, What Lawyers Need, 52
EMORY L.J. 1053, 1056 (2003) (observing that neglect, failure to communicate, and failures of
diligence occupy more than half the volume of lawyer discipline, expressed as both complaints
and sanctions).
56. For an unsurprised reaction, see Hornsby, supra note 45, at 26 ("It's no secret that most
state disciplinary agencies put a low priority on enforcing ethics rules that govern client
development.").
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My state-bar informant kindly posted a query on the
disciplinarians' listserv (an online mailing list), which gave me early
leads and anecdotes as background for various electronic queries.
Next, my research assistant and I turned to decisional law published
in Lexis and Westlaw. We sought terms like "7.3," "DR 2-103," and
"direct ... contact."5  With these searches completed, my assistant
then visited the website of every state bar and supreme court to
review online databases of disciplinary actions. 8 When a state did
not have a database for him to search, he got on the phone.59 These
searches away from Lexis and Westlaw yielded about twenty-five
new instances for the list. I checked the ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual
on Professional Conduct,6 ° a proprietary database jointly published
by the ABA and the Bureau of National Affairs. My research
assistant then did a succession of searches on Google, just to sweep
what might remain, which turned up no hitherto missed instances of
discipline.
All instances of solicitation discipline that these methods
retrieved are gathered in the Appendix, which lists them in
alphabetical order by state. I refer to a few of them later in the text
and footnotes of this Article.6' Where citations to decisional law
exist, the Appendix provides them; for each instance of discipline not
officially reported yet public, the Appendix gives a URL (that
worked at the time this Symposium issue was published).62
Undoubtedly, some sanctions for solicitation are excluded from the
survey because they took the form of private reprimands: my
contention about these unreported sanctions is that they too amount
to condoning.63
57. Mutatis mutandis for the minority of jurisdictions that have not adopted the Model Rules
or who number their solicitation bans as something other than 7.3.
58. About half the states have websites suited to this research. Others provide less useful
data (for example, archives that cannot be searched) or no information at all.
59. He reported to me that these phone calls "were in some cases elucidating," but they led
to no instances of discipline that he did not already have.
60. ABA & BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROF'L
CONDUCT, http://www.bna.com/products/lit/mopc.htm.
61. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 52.
63. See Daily Gazette Co. v. Comm. on Legal Ethics, 326 S.E. 2d 705, 711 (W. Va. 1984)
(holding that the private reprimand could not be used as a sanction because it conflicts with
constitutional principles of open government). See generally Levin, supra note 50, at 34-49
(offering constitutional and common law arguments against secrecy in discipline).
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Finally, in pursuit of softer data about solicitation bans as
enforcers perceive them, I also conducted telephone interviews of
several lawyers who enforce disciplinary rules, including officials in
the solicitation-tolerant jurisdictions of the District of Columbia and
Virginia. For contrary views, I contacted bar counsel who had gone
after solicitation and attorneys based at the ABA's Center for
Professional Responsibility. At the ABA annual meeting in August
2007, I attended programs and a reception that drew bar counsel,
where I was able to speak informally to other enforcers about
solicitation in their jurisdictions. One goal I had for these
conversations was to see whether an attitude toward this particular
disciplinary offense would emerge.64
B. Whittling the List
The sixty-two instances of discipline for solicitation reported
from 2002 to 2007 might exaggerate the extent to which the bar
imposes penalties for this offense.
1. Solicitation Coupled With a Behavior about Which
the Bar Appears to Care More
Only about half the reported cases put any emphasis on
solicitation. This offense, though fundamental and central for my
purpose, frequently turned up as a lesser charge in a multi-count set
of accusations that paid heed to something worse. The Colorado
lawyer who collected compensation to which he knew he was not
entitled and mishandled client property-and who also did not show
up at his disciplinary hearing-probably would have been disbarred
anyway even if he had not solicited the heirs of the estate he had
looted.65 Sanctions are imposed on a per-lawyer rather than a per-
transgression basis, and most lawyer sanctions announced to the
public respond to more than one offense. Accordingly, a disciplinary
authority that adjudicated a charge of solicitation, found it credible,
and sanctioned the offending lawyer might well have imposed the
same penalty absent solicitation, in response to other offenses in the
record.
64. The attempt was inconclusive. I thought I detected a bit of boredom with the topic but
am not sure.
65. People v. Cozier, 74 P.3d 531, 538 (Colo. 2003).
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Schemes for lawyer discipline contain few assignments of
relative weight for particular offenses of the kind that appear in
sentencing guidelines and felony hierarchies. A regular reader of the
disciplinary sheets learns that the bar has a couple of strong
antipathies: to anything resembling intentional conversion of client
property, for example, and to deceit that produces gain for the
lawyer. It seems fair to infer that if a lawyer received a sanction
following substantiated accusations of both solicitation and theft
from a client trust account, the two offenses did not each contribute
equally to the weight of the sanction.
Lines emerge. If Model Rule 7.3 were written in the District of
Columbia or Virginia mode that this Article has provisionally
endorsed, then all solicitations that hurt clients would remain under
the disciplinary umbrella. Any duress, coercion, harassment, or
exploitation of client vulnerability that accompanies solicitation
warrants disapproval. Solicitations alleged to hurt only "the public,
or the legal system,"66 however-a conclusory judgment that
demands no overt showing of harm-would not, under this approach,
subject lawyers to discipline. Model Rule 7.3, as was noted, takes a
contrary position. Lawyers are subject to discipline for solicitation
even when their overtures treat prospective clients fairly, and eschew
duress and coercion. Benign overtures thus fill the cases that a
whittling study must preserve.6 7 Do disciplinarians sanction the no-
harm-to-clients category of solicitation? Or do they sanction it?
And so the whittling proceeds: when an account of discipline for
solicitation included findings that the attorney violated other rules
that the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions regards as
necessary for the protection of clients, and for whose violation the
ABA recommends disbarment or suspension when clients are hurt, I
excluded that case, along with those that included theft or overt
venality by the lawyer. On this corner of my cutting-room floor lie
combinations of solicitation with other offenses, including repeated
66. ABA, Standards, supra note 51, at R. 7.1.
67. As the Court stated:
By "benign" commercial solicitation, I mean solicitation by advice and information
that is truthful and that is presented in a noncoercive, nondeceitful, and dignified
manner to a potential client who is emotionally and physically capable of making a
rational decision either to accept or reject the representation with respect to a legal
claim or matter that is not frivolous.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 472 n.3 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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neglect,68 assisting in the unauthorized practice of law,69 giving
advice to a client that was contrary to the client's interests,7" and
improper retention of a retainer fee.71
2. Priors
One respondent deemed "no stranger to the disciplinary process"
who testified falsely in one of his prior proceedings7 2 embodies the
next whittling-down category, also taken from the Standards: prior
disciplinary offenses, which the ABA ranks highest on an eleven-
item list of "aggravating circumstances . . . that may justify an
increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed."73  Here my
premise is that, just as a lawyer who receives a sanction following an
accusation of both solicitation and theft is being punished for theft
rather than solicitation, or (at most) for theft made more egregious
because the lawyer preceded it by soliciting his victim, a lawyer with
a history of disciplinary offenses who receives a sanction following
an accusation of solicitation is being punished for his unruliness--or
his sociopathic refusal to stay in line-rather than, or at most made
worse by, the soliciting he did. Prior disciplinary offenses counted
for this purpose only if they were not limited to solicitation.
3. Technical Violations
Model Rule 7.3 and its state-level variations subject lawyers to
discipline for writing to prospective clients without conspicuously
including words like "Advertising Material."74 These provisos turn
otherwise proper written solicitations into sanction-worthy offenses,
and a sizeable fraction of the disciplinary docket includes reprimands
for this lapse.75 The substantive content of the communications in
such cases does not violate any disciplinary provisions. I eliminated
68. See infra Appendix Nos. 25, 45.
69. See infra Appendix No. 29.
70. See infra Appendix No. 38.
71. See infra Appendix No. 54.
72. Sup. Ct. Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Bjorklund, 725 N.W.2d 1, 1 (Iowa 2006).
73. ABA, Standards, supra note 52, at R. 9.21.
74. See, e.g., N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(b)(5)(i) (2007) (insisting that written
solicitations be labeled ADVERTISEMENT, using capital letters); OHIO RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT 7.3(e) (2007) (mandating lengthy boilerplate called "Understanding Your Rights" as
an addition to all written solicitations).
75. See infra Appendix.
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these instances of discipline in the belief that they focused on
careless noncompliance with (or perhaps ignorance of) technical
rules, rather than on solicitation per se.
4. Runners, Hirelings, and Subordinates
Who Do the Soliciting
Many lawyers who were accused of solicitation did not
approach prospective clients themselves but engaged other people to
do their soliciting for them.76 Like the repeat-offender sanctions
mentioned above, these instances of sanctioning looked to me like
punishment for something other than the solicitation of new clients.
Disciplined lawyers tended to have violated rules other than the
counterparts to Model Rule 7.3, such as those governing supervision
of subordinates and the ban on giving another person "anything of
value" in exchange for recommending the lawyer's services.77
Employing what used to be called "lay runners"-nonlawyers
who solicit new clients, usually for personal injury practitioners-
differs from, and in crucial ways is more dangerous than, solicitation
by lawyers themselves. A lay runner by hypothesis cannot answer
the prospective client's questions as well as a lawyer can.78 To the
extent they say anything to clients about rights, strategies,
opportunities, or tradeoffs that diverges from what the lawyer later
says, these runners sow confusion in a way that a unitary voice
necessarily can forestall. Their compensation for bringing a client
through the door rather than by the hour, or for achieving a
satisfactory result, encourages them to overpromise; a lawyer who
solicits clients, by contrast, must absorb the detriments as well as the
benefits of each retainer, and thus has incentives to tell prospective
clients a realistic story. Their compensation also defeats one
potential defense of solicitation, which reasons that although some
lawyers cannot afford to buy advertisements, none is too cash-
76. According to a bar journal article by the chief disciplinarian of Minnesota, published in
the middle of the period I studied, most of the solicitation-enforcement in his office involves ill-
supervised subordinates, working particularly "within the various ethnic communities in the Twin
Cities." Kenneth L. Jorgenson, In-Person Solicitation: Not for Lawyers, BENCH & BAR OF
MINN., Sept. 2004, at 13, available at http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2004/sept04/
profresponse.htm.
77. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT RS. 5.3, 7.2(b) (2007).
78. Note that the whole domain of professional regulation rests on a belief that, with respect
to serving clients, credentialed lawyers are more competent than amateurs.
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strapped to solicit a new client, and so permitting solicitation would
help disadvantaged lawyers earn a living.79 Because of the additional
dangers, and absence of offsetting benefits, that third-party soliciting
agents pose-and because using subordinates or lay runners for
solicitation violates other rules-I deemed this subset of solicitation
distinct from solicitation done by lawyers themselves and removed
these cases from consideration.
5. The Remainder
After the removal of another case as sui generis, ° there
remained two, one in Wisconsin and one in Illinois. The Wisconsin
case was based on reciprocity for the Illinois offense and involved
the same lawyer, one Timothy Michael Whiting, once listed on a
roster of top lawyers under forty.8' Mr. Whiting sent a letter to the
family of a Wisconsin woman who had been killed by a careless
driver. He emphasized his connections to both Illinois and
Wisconsin:
I am also writing because I believe due to my past and
present connection with Wisconsin, I am in a position to
offer your family assistance in bringing justice to those who
maliciously caused this incident. My firm specializes in
catastrophic automobile accidents and wrongful death cases
such as your family's case. Moreover, conveniently
enough, we have offices in both Chicago, where the crash
took place, and in Delavan, Wisconsin, which is in your
locale. In addition, in the past I have handled police chase
cases in Illinois that have also resulted in the wrongful
death of a family member. Therefore, based on my firm's
expertise and experience in cases similar to yours and the
79. See Levy, supra note 16, at 281 (attributing this claim about distributive justice to Justice
Marshall's concurrence in Ohralik).
80. In re McElroy, 637 S.E.2d 705 (Ga. 2006), which reports the voluntary surrender of a
license following a charge of solicitation, provides no details about Mr. McElroy's misconduct.
The relinquishment followed a negotiation whose terms are not public. An official of the Georgia
bar informed me that the totality of the circumstances warranted this severe-looking consequence.
Telephone interview with William Smith III, General Counsel, State Bar of Ga. (Jan. 4, 2008). If
the facts of McElroy had been reported, I would have excluded it on the "runners" criterion. See
supra Part II.B.4.
81. In re Whiting, 667 N.W.2d 355, 356 (Wis. 2003); Whiting Law Group, Biography for
Managing Partner Timothy M. Whiting, http://www.wlglaw.net/attomeys/tmw.htm (last visited
Nov. 5, 2008).
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fact that we can serve you [sic] and your family's interests
both in Wisconsin and Illinois, I would be honored to be
able to help in any way I can.
I realize this tragic event is still very fresh, and I apologize
for the interruption of you [sic] and your family's grieving.
However, in order to properly pursue an action against the
police department, an immediate investigation by private
investigators and photographers is necessary to preserve the
evidence. Thus, if you plan on pursuing your mother's
case, I highly recommend you act quickly.82
The Illinois Supreme Court had issued a public reprimand, accepting
without comment a recommendation from the state Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Committee.83
Recall the (conservatively estimated) denominator: 6,200
sanctions a year, or 31,000 from 2002 to 2007. Observers agree that
the disciplinary rules are underenforced:84 even if the 6,200 figure
were complete, which it is not, it excludes many violations in fact.
Whether we count Timothy Michael Whiting as a numerator of 2 or
1, the whittled-down fraction is a tiny number.85
Recall that before commencing to whittle down the number, for
the 2002-2007 period I had found sixty-two instances of discipline in
82. Letter from Timothy Michael Whiting to the Zakrzewicz Family (2001) (on file with
author).
83. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois,
Recently Filed Disciplinary Decisions from the Supreme Court as of Thursday January 23, 2003,
http://www.iardc.org/co-pressreleases-copy9.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
84. This consensus brings together a range of commentators not generally inclined to reach
the same conclusions on other issues. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 143-50
(1989) (observing consistent lack of enforcement over several decades); WOLFRAM, supra note 1,
at 80 (observing that lawyer "discipline is selective, episodic, [and] subject to constraints of
fluctuating budgets and personnel ability"); Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism,
63 FORDHAM L. REV. 949, 950 (1995) (contending that lawyers have their own slovenly
enforcement of their rules to blame for the low esteem in which the public holds them); David B.
Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 469, 503 (1990) ("The rules of
professional conduct are chronically underenforced.").
85. And so it is curious that one catalogue of underenforced rules of professional
responsibility does not mention solicitation. Zacharias, supra note 33, at 999-1001 (naming other
candidates: the obligation to report misconduct by other lawyers, unauthorized practice in the
form of advising clients in states where the lawyer holds no license, obligations to expedite
litigation, and prohibitions on paying clients' costs and on making statements to the press while
litigation is pending).
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response to charges that included solicitation, amounting to one-fifth
of 1 percent of all discipline imposed, a much larger number than
2/31,000 but still small. Anyone inclined to retain any of the cases I
took out-believing, for instance, that violation of the rule against
paying people to recommend employment is intrinsic to solicitation
rather than a separate transgression,86 or that failure to label one's
written solicitation as advertising material amounts to more than a
technical lapse-will not significantly change the bottom line by
restoring them. In practice, the disciplinary docket read sanctioning
to mean condoning, just as clearly as the blackletter rules read
sanctioning to mean disapproving.
III. SOLICITATION BANS AS "EXPRESSIVE" (OF WHAT?)
A. Lawyer Regulation and Expressive Law
The gap between sweeping bans of solicitation on one hand and
widespread toleration of this practice on the other invites recourse to
what commentators, in a literature that emerged in the 1990s, have
called the "expressive function of law ... [or] (for short) 'expressive
law."' 87 "It must be expressive" constitutes one possible explanation
for an almost complete lack of enforcement.88 This perspective on
positive law maintains that regulations or doctrines influence
behavior even where individuals face little or no enforcement in the
form of sanctions. Put slightly differently, law can generate norms;89
and members of communities hew to norms even when they have
reason to believe that law enforcers will not formally punish
noncompliance.
86. Rick Abel took this position. See Abel Message, supra note 30. I think it may be
correct.
87. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REv. 1649,
1650-51 n.2 (2000).
88. Fred Zacharias focuses on two other explanations: the regulation in question may be
hortatory rather than enforceable by design; alternatively, the disciplinary authorities may have
inadequate resources to enforce all the rules and so focus on the ones they deem most important.
Zacharias, supra note 33, at 1003. In my view, "expressive law" as a rationale touches on both of
those possibilities.
89. Matthew Adler observes that the "norms" and the "expressive" literatures consider
related and overlapping, yet not exactly the same, material. Matthew D. Adler, Expressive
Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1363, 1373-74 (2000); see also
Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 680-85 (1998)
(distinguishing "social meaning" from "norms").
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Going beyond this description of how positive law can function,
writers have elaborated on expressive law in normative terms. They
find an expressive "ought" or "should" inside legislation apart from
whether and how much it interferes with human activities. Richard
Pildes, for instance, finds considerable expressive content in laws
governing elections and voting, a domain that imposes few sanctions
on the citizenry.9" In a co-authored article, he sees the jagged shape
of an invalidated election district as expressive of an unfortunate
"race consciousness [that] has overridden all other, traditionally
relevant redistricting values."91  Expressive theorists, most
prominently Dan Kahan, have pointed out that just as law inhibits
and shapes behavior regardless of whether individuals suffer
sanctions, the application of law-based sanctions can, in expressive
effect, amount to almost no sanction at all. Kahan's obvious-yet-
trenchant illustration of "no sanction at all" is a fine or a community-
service sentence following a criminal conviction.92 Focusing on the
expressive function of law in this normative mode permits an
observer to be neutral on the normative value of a law as written
while holding strong views about the normative value of a law as
perceived and enacted. Kahan and Tracey Meares have argued that
setting up reverse-sting operations to anticipate drug deals ("reverse"
in the sense of targeting customers rather than vendors) outside the
inner city would offer the expressive benefit of making drug-law
enforcement appear universal and desirable, rather than focused
almost exclusively on harassing nonwhite populations.93 Kahan and
Meares hold no brief for reverse-sting operations as described in the
ethnic-neutral language of a police manual; they take this maneuver
as a law enforcement given, and seek to share it with a different set
of spectators.
90. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503, 1541 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on
Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2535 (1997).
91. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts, " and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV.
483, 526-27 (1993).
92. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591, 593
(1996).
93. Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms oj) Order in the Inner City, 32
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 805, 818-19 (1998).
1564
Summer 2008]SANCTIONING THE AMBULANCE CHASER
With this quick summary I take no position on the doubts that
scholars have raised about this genre,94 and say only that for anyone
who thinks "expressive law" may have value as a means to
understand or improve legal doctrine, lawyer regulation presents an
especially congenial proving-ground for the hypothesis. It works
better, in my view, than constitutional law and state-sponsored
punishment, the two fields where expressive-law studies have
flourished. Lawyer regulation, unlike American public law
generally, has been allowed to constrain individuals because of its
concern with appearances and public relations,95 whereas this
concern as a sole basis for government actions that constrain the
larger public will often affront equal protection.96  Governments
might be too big or ill-defined ("We the People") to do much
expressing,97 or to justify their acts with reference to expressive
value; but the legal profession as embodied in a state bar contains a
discrete membership understood to have relinquished some of the
liberties and prerogatives that attach to citizens outside the
profession. This field also offers an expressive-law writer a unique
boon in contrast to the law of punishment: Whereas a few particular
criminal laws-bans on littering, for example-are widely seen as
not too enforced, we have here an entire rule book, not just the
solicitation ban in it, perceived to lack teeth,98 thus giving outsiders a
setting that approaches law without sanctions. Any look at any
lawyer regulation fills a gap in the expressive-law literature, which
so far has had little to say about rules of the legal profession.99
94. See Adler, supra note 89; Patricia Funk, Is There an Expressive Function of Law?: An
Empirical Analysis of Voting Laws with Symbolic Fines, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 135 (2007),
available at http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/9//l135.
95. More so in the Code than the Rules, yet the idea is manifest in the Rules as well. See
infra Part IV.
96. "Rational basis" analysis under the Equal Protection Clause-as indulgent as judicial
scrutiny gets-might demand more than flattering anyone's appearance.
97. Adler, supra note 89, at 1410-12.
98. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
99. For rare exceptions, see Pamela S. Karlan, Compelling Interests/Compelling Institutions:
Law Schools as Constitutional Litigants, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1613, 1630 (2007) (suggesting that
when the Supreme Court forced law schools to allow military recruiters on their campuses, it
ignored the "expressive element in law schools' placement operations"); Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024 (1996) (arguing that mandatory pro
bono might be better than charging lawyers fees to help the poor because of expressive concerns).
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B. Expressions
As suggested by the examples noted above (jagged electoral
districts signify a preoccupation with race, community-service
sentences are not punishment), that which expressive law expresses
is at least in part in the eye of us beholders. One cannot look it up.
An observer who esteems the solicitation ban might see it as
communicating a concern for the welfare of vulnerable laypeople or
disapproval of predatory behavior by lawyers. Unavoidable
subjectivity means that onlookers may well disagree with me about
what this ban expresses; but anyone who looks for an expressive
message in the prohibition of solicitation need not defer to the
ABA's homily about "overwhelmed" clients, "importuning" by
"trained advocates," and the need to fend off a "fraught"
encounter,1"' any more than one must accept a slap on the wrist as
constituting real punishment.
1. Messages from the Written Ban
a. Repeat-player clients outrank one-shotters
By allowing lawyers to solicit retainers from their existing
clients and to exploit their professional and personal relationships to
gain new work, the ban on solicitation expresses disapproval for the
formation of a new relationship when lawyers initiate it overtly. In
the personal injury context of this Article, repeat-player clients-
including insurance companies, product manufacturers, hospitals,
and other institutions that provide medical services-are unimpeded
by the solicitation ban; they have their counsel. Injured persons are
one-shotters: individuals who find themselves needing lawyers for
the first time or for an unfamiliar crisis. To the extent that the
relevant population of lawyers is inhibited by the solicitation ban,
these prospective clients have to negotiate alien territory unaided.
They can expect little or no legal advice until they make their way to
the office of a lawyer whom they do not know, a threshold that most
injured persons with valid claims do not cross."°0
Critics of the solicitation ban have been noting for nearly a
century, to little avail, that it is unfair to give insurance claims
100. MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt. 1 (2007).
101. Abel, Too Few Claims, supra note 16, at 448.
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adjusters the access to injured persons that plaintiffs' lawyers do not
have. 1 2 An agent for an insurer or other repeat player can approach a
prospective plaintiff immediately after a traumatic impact, waiver in
hand, and obtain a full release before this person has had a chance to
seek legal advice." 3 Extraordinarily egregious terms might be
invalidated later in court, but as a general rule, an injury victim who
regrets having signed a waiver too hastily must expect to be stuck
with her bargain.0 4 Unpersuaded by an amicus brief detailing this
argument,0 5 the majority in Went for It upheld Florida's thirty-day
ban on written solicitation by deeming it necessary to prevent
intrusive and invasive conduct, even though the state did not
similarly thwart whatever intrusions and invasions insurers would
choose to pursue. "The rule, in short, was not narrowly tailored to
protect accident victims," wrote one luminary soon after the decision
came down.0 6  "It appears crafted to protect the insurance
industry."'0 7
To the extent that an overture from a lawyer comes across to the
target as intrusive or abusive rather than an offer of welcomed legal
assistance-a theme that the Went for It majority pressed heavily-
banning solicitation does nothing to protect another group of targets,
existing or past clients, except insofar as it reduces the volume of
overtures to them.0 8 "There is far less likelihood that a lawyer would
102. Minor Bronaugh, The Ambulance Chaser vs. the Claim Agent, LAW NOTES, Oct. 1920,
at 126. The defendant in the famous case of Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E.
173 (N.Y. 1929), kept an insurance adjuster in its onsite infirmary, ready to present patrons of
rides like the Flopper with releases to sign. Robert N. Strassfeld, Taking Another Ride on
Flopper: Benjamin Cardozo, Safe Space, and the Cultural Significance of Coney Island, 25
CARDOZO L. REV 2189, 2226 (2004).
103. A column in a lawyers' journal featuring anecdotes from practitioners related a story
about a client who had driven a car that ran off the road. With traumatic edema so severe that the
dental surgeon who treated him called him a pumpkin head, this man was placed in a no-visitors
room. An insurance adjuster slipped past the nurses, entered the room, and left with a signed
release. War Stories, PA. LAWYER, May-June 2003, at 42, 43.
104. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Allstate Ins. Co., 562 So. 2d 1099 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting
claims of duress and fraud even though the plaintiff alleged she had been in pain when signing
the agreement, had not read it, and believed that the $250 she received had been an advance for
her medical expenses).
105. Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 639-40 (1995) (discussing Brief for the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent).
106. Ronald D. Rotunda, Professionalism, Legal Advertising, and Free Speech in the Wake of
Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 49 ARK. L. REv. 703, 721 (1997).
107. Id.
108. One argument from the anti-solicitation camp objects to the swarm of letters that victims
receive from lawyers when they or their relatives survive a serious accident that receives
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engage in abusive practices against an individual who is a former
client," the ABA tells us in commentary to Model Rule 7.3, with no
further explanation."°9 An earlier comment presumes that "abuse"
involves a "prospective client, who may already feel overwhelmed
by the circumstances giving rise to the need for legal services," who
will find it "difficult fully to evaluate all available alternatives with
reasoned judgment and appropriate self-interest in the face of the
lawyer's presence and insistence upon being retained
immediately." ''1  Existing relationships do not lack the same
difficulty. An extensive literature depicts professionals generally,
not just lawyers, as disabling: in dealing with clients they assert their
expertise, insist that their occupational skills are necessary to resolve
a problem, push away alternative sources of help, and pump up
demand for their costly services."' There is no reason to suppose
that a longstanding professional-client relationship weakens these
levers of manipulation.
b. Cream rises
Here I begin with an axiom: the rule book of a self-regulated
profession will not contain provisions designed to be bad for its
membership. Lawyers may appear chafed or restricted by provisions
in the Model Rules, but every Thou Shalt Not commandment in it,
drafted and enforced by the legal profession, must necessarily have
been written to advance the interests of this group and only
incidentally to take prerogatives away from any individual.
newspaper or television attention, or was noted in a police blotter. See Power of Attorneys,
Lawyers, Meeting by Accident, Dec. 2001, http://www.power-of-
attorneys.com/meet byaccident.htm. Again one has to wonder about selective regulation. See
infra Part III.B. 1.d. A few years ago I let my house listing lapse when the real estate agents I had
engaged for the standard three-month period failed to find a buyer. Day ninety-one brought
several letters and post cards from brokers eager to pick up the listing. They did put me in mind
of buzzards, but their move seemed reasonable enough; I even sent an e-mail message to one of
them praising the cleverness and wit of her pitch. Life went on. I have never heard anyone attack
real estate agents for pelting property owners with paper, or propose that they be silenced in the
Went for It mode. True, the failure to sell one's house before a listing expires is less traumatic
than literal trauma. But getting a few written solicitations from strangers (even soon after a
terrible accident) that one can quickly throw in the trash does not blight anyone's life.
109. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt 4 (2007).
110. Id. cmt 1.
111. See Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1227, 1296
(1994) (citing IVAN ILLICH, DISABLING PROFESSIONS 25-28 (1977), and other critiques of the
professions).
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Bountiful employment for lawyers can coexist with a ban on
lawyers' seeking new employment, in other words, only if one starts
from the premise that asking for an opportunity to perform lucrative
work is neither necessary nor sufficient for obtaining it.
As observed (with polite restraint) by Thurgood Marshall in his
Ohralik concurrence, the repeat-player advantage noted above with
respect to clients applies also to those who counsel them."' The ban
on solicitation declares that social forces rather than overt
recruitment efforts should allocate representation to clients and
remunerative work to lawyers. 13 These forces coalesce in the
lawyer's reputation: his current and past clients, his roles in wider
communities, his school affiliations, his home, his appearance, his
office address, and the colleagues and family and friends who have
known him, preferably for some time, and connect him to respected
sources of tradition.
The crux of one's reputation is its independence from the words
about oneself that one might speak, or wish to speak. Lawyers
cannot script, rewrite, or erase their reputation, at least not overtly. It
exists as a condition external to them. When it is good, the anti-
solicitation ideology maintains that clients will come to them
offering remunerative work. When it is not so good, or still
developing, this ideology tells deficient lawyers to respond with
patience rather than hustle. Perhaps "bona fide political, social,
civic, fraternal, employee or trade organizations whose purposes
include providing or recommending legal services"" 4 will offer some
conditional welcome to these fledglings and non-elite aspirants.
Until then, all lawyers, whether they have enough remunerative work
to make a living or not, may take comfort in the certitude that cream
rises.
c. Clients as lawyers 'property
A third iteration of the conservative politics in the message of
the ban equates solicitation with poaching. Wealthy or sophisticated
clients will make their own decisions about whether to consult their
existing lawyers or look for others. A different set of prospects is
112. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468-77 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring).
113. Seeid. at 474-75.
114. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt. 4.
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lying hurt and bleeding on the ground (or terrified of the telephone as
a vector for their creditors, or about to lose their homes), too weak to
find their own lawyers or unattractive to the networks that match
clients with attorneys by genteel means.
Some minority of this second set bear pecuniary value, and the
lawyers close to these clients who think that this value belongs to
them-and who may have prospected this value through solicitation
themselves-will regard the overtures of their peers as a danger to
their economic interests." 5 A lawyer hungry or aggressive enough to
eschew more delicate alternatives and cross Model Rule 7.3 will
probably not defer to the embedded labor, or entitlement, that made
the client belong to someone else." 6  Solicitation is an affront
because it threatens the holdings of another lawyer who got there
first. 117
d. Thin, selective protection of the ostensibly vulnerable
In an earlier work about aggression as a legal concept, I argued
that both public-law and private-law regulation of behaviors that
individual targets experience as boundary-crossing should be
evaluated in tripartite terms: (1) the invasion or violation, on one side
of the ledger; (2) the gain to the invader, on the other side; and (3)
the external social judgment that balances the two against each other.
Although the exercise does not determine whether a particular
practice should be condoned or prohibited, it uses a taxonomy that
facilitates borrowing and precedent-making, so that persons drafting
a rule about sexual harassment, for instance, could consider lessons
from the law of predatory pricing, undue influence, and aggressive
panhandling, inter alia."8 This perspective associates lawyers who
solicit new clients with other actors who walk up to relatively
vulnerable strangers and try to initiate a relationship, or at least a
115. See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 786-88 (suggesting that the solicitation ban functions to
reduce economic risks for lawyers).
116. See generally Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1074
(2005) (describing Locke's labor theory of property).
117. Leslie C. Levin, Lawyers in Cyberspace: The Impact of Legal Listservs on the
Professional Development and Ethical Decisionmaking of Lawyers, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 589, 608-
611 (2005) [hereinafter Levin, Lawyers in Cyberspace] (discussing lawyers' comments on a
listserv, where lawyers complained that ambulance chasers steal cases).
118. Anita Bernstein, Reciprocity, Utility, and the Law of Aggression, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1
(2001).
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round of dealings, that will generate financial or legal consequences
for the persons to whom they speak. If the lawyer does not use a
subordinate or runner to make this overture (a premise I have been
trying to hew to when looking for the center of solicitation), then we
may assume that solicitations that become known to the disciplinary
offices were unwanted by the prospective clients, because someone
would have had to complain.
The prospective client thus occupies the first leg of the triangle,
which contains a sense of being invaded or violated. The third leg of
the triangle, the external one, reaches a clear written conclusion
about in-person, live solicitation that accepts this perceived invasion
or violation. It forbids the practice categorically. The aggressor's
second-leg point of view-maybe she really needs the work, or
deeply believes her target needs a lawyer like her, and also knows
that advertising, written solicitation, and the genteel forces that make
cream rise will not connect her to this prospective client-appears
utterly disregarded.
Elsewhere, the law regulates the same category of invasion-an
aggressive individual approaches a vulnerable person and proposes a
round of dealings that have financial or legal consequences for the
target-with much more solicitude for the interests of the aggressor.
We have already remarked on the insurance claims adjuster who
rushes up to injured persons, perhaps literally chasing them in
ambulances in a way that lawyers are not allowed to do, with a
waiver in hand for them to sign without the advice of counsel." 9
More examples abound. Police officers are not entirely inhibited by
the Fourth Amendment when they want to kick open household
doors,"' peer into dark automobiles 2' and into buildings via infrared
imaging,'22 or rifle through garbage cans.'23  Lying to federal
investigators can be prosecuted as a felony, even when the liar did
119. See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
120. See Matthew A. Edwards, Posner's Pragmatism and Payton Home Arrests, 77 WASH. L.
REv. 299, 341-49 (2002) (reviewing a pattern of judicial deference).
121. Kendra Hillman Chilcoat, The Automobile Exception Swallows the Rule: Florida v.
White, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 917, 940 (2000) ("Courts seldom place limits any longer
on searches and seizures under the automobile exception. Instead, judges use judicial deference
to police officials as justification to permit greater latitude by the police.") (footnotes omitted).
122. Michael L. Huskins, Comment, Mari'uana Hot Spots: Infrared Imaging and the Fourth
Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 655, 656 (1996).
123. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-44 (1988).
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not swear to tell the truth. 2 4  Two chief lawyers of the Bush
administration refused to condemn the torture of suspects in offshore
U.S. custody and the practice of rendition, whereby the government
transports individuals to foreign destinations knowing they will be
tortured or killed. 25  Persons charged with sexual assault who
proceeded with physical contact without receiving a go-ahead from
their target can benefit from their "mistake of fact" on the question of
consent.1 26  What recipients experience as rape, torture, homicide,
bullying, home invasion, and so on, in short, may be acceptable
behaviors in a particular context. Live, in-person solicitation of
strangers for pecuniary gain is categorically unacceptable, always.
2. Messages from the Wan Enforcement Rate
Sanctioning = Disapproving (a rigid ban) combined with
Sanctioning = Tolerating (extraordinarily little enforcement of the
ban) expresses a mixed message. Notwithstanding the Model Rules'
contention that solicitation threatens prospective clients with the risk
of abuse,'27 one expressive message of underenforcement-consistent
with the another ABA statement that solicitation is not really a threat
to clients 2-tells lawyers that although solicitation does not subject
lawyers to discipline, the practice is tacky. It's food for lawyer
jokes, something that happens but that they would never do. 29 The
very rare occasions of public sanctions announce that the practice
does occasionally attract disciplinary attention: you could get in
trouble, goes the message, and wouldn't you be embarrassed? All
those ambulance chasers out there, don't we all know that, and look,
they came after you. Meanwhile, do what you have to do. As long
as you keep your overtures discreet and do not offend the people you
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
125. Dan Froomkin, The Gonzales Legacy, WASHINGTONPOST.COM., Nov. 7, 2007, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/2007/11/07/BL2007110701444-pf.html
(describing the stated views of attorneys general Alberto Gonzales and Michael Mukasey).
126. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMNAL LAW 637-38 (4th ed. 2006)
(describing the prevailing rule that a mistaken yet genuine belief in the partner/victim's consent
precludes criminal liability for rape or sexual assault).
127. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 7.3 cmt (2007).
128. See id. at cmt. 4.
129. A study of a large trial lawyers' listserv identified scorn and anger toward "ambulance
chasing." Levin, Lawyers in Cyberspace, supra note 117, at 608-12.
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solicit (or the lawyers on whose business you encroach 3°) enough to
make them complain, you will be fine.
This shrugging at the mixed message suggests cynicism about
the bar's attitude toward lawyers who pursue clients overtly. One
can find no evidence that leaving solicitation undisturbed promotes
an image of lawyers as delicate, restrained professionals in the
shrinking violet mode. Nor do newer anti-solicitation measures like
the thirty-day ban seem to be eroding the stereotype of lawyers as
greedy predators. 3'
IV. CONCLUSION: THE TROUBLE WITH A MIXED
MESSAGE ON SOLICITATION
Lawyer regulation should not sanction any behavior in both
(opposing) senses of the word sanction. That which is not wrong and
also offers benefits ought to be at least tolerated, if not approved, in
codes of conduct. That which is punished ought to be wrong.
This stance amounts to a mandate from the ABA, which in its
transition from the Model Code to the Model Rules jettisoned those
of its provisions that focused only on appearances or public relations.
The current plenary prohibition of misconduct, Model Rule 8.4,
borrows many of the Model Code prohibitions but omits the one
telling lawyers to refrain from any conduct that reflects adversely on
their fitness to practice law.'32 Lawyers, as was mentioned, under the
current rules do not have to refrain from "self-laudatory"
communications as they did under the Code.'33 What they do to
publicize themselves need no longer be "dignified,"'34 whatever that
means. Judges governed by the Code of Judicial Conduct have to
130. Id. at 610 (identifying a perception among trial lawyers that solicitation is objectionable
because it amounts to client-stealing).
131. On the futility of image-burnishing initiatives in general, see Michael C. Doff, Can the
Legal Profession Improve Its Image?: Americans Believe Lawyers to Be Necessary but
Dishonest, Survey Finds, FINDLAW'S WRIT, April 17, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
dorf/20020417.html; on the futility of solicitation measure in particular, see Editorial, Restrain
Greedy Lawyers, [Cleveland] PLAIN DEALER, June 3, 1999, at 8B (remarking that Ohio's 30-day
ban "doesn't go nearly far enough. But it's a bit better than nothing.").
132. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(6) (1983).
133. Id. DR-101(A).
134. Id. DR 2-101(B), DR 2-101(H), DR 2-102(A); see also Steven A. Delchin & Sean P.
Costello, Show Me Your Wares: The Use of Sexually Provocative Ads to Attract Clients, 30
SETON HALL L. REv. 64, 64-70 (1999) (referring to the business-getting efforts of a real estate
lawyer in New York).
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avoid even the appearance of impropriety, but when the Model Rules
rejected this erstwhile Canon 9 of the Model Code, they excused
lawyers from this dictum.'35
The need to care less about appearances and more about real
harms has grown stronger since the Rules replaced the Code a
generation ago. An occupation that continues to grow, become more
diverse on several fronts, and connect more to a complex global
economy cannot govern itself with clubhouse rules, enforcing
dogmas too hidden for newcomers to look up and learn. The opaque
ban on solicitation burdens and baffles relatively disadvantaged
lawyers, adding in effect another layer of comfort for the privileged.
The same regressive politics continues to hurt clients. Liberalizing
the solicitation rules would deliver more information to them,
especially about the cost of legal services. Contrary to the claims of
solicitation-suppressors, the rise of advertising and communication
technology has not eliminated clients' need for in-person, live
colloquy about what lies ahead.'36
Liberalizing, for this purpose, does not commend a retreat from
regulation.'37 The bar should retain its concern about the "potential
for abuse" that solicitation raises-a concern that remains in view in
the two jurisdictions that have gone furthest to relax this ban.
Coercion, duress, pestering a layperson who does not want to be
pestered, and proposing a lawyer-client relationship to someone in no
condition to consider this proposal must subject a lawyer to
discipline. The rewritten rule on solicitation that I advocate also
depends on reliable enforcement of related rules, particularly those
governing supervision of subordinates and the giving of money or
135. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101 ("Avoiding Even the Appearance
of Impropriety").
136. In the Supreme Court's solicitation cases Justice O'Connor expressed the belief-a
misguided one, in my view-that disadvantaged individuals who could benefit from legal advice
do not need solicitation, because advertising gives them the information they would otherwise
lack. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 633-34 (1995); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 480 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
137. In other contexts I have argued, sometimes with reference to "the new regulation" or
"responsive regulation," that switching to a lighter touch on regulation and doctrine does not
constitute surrender on substantive pursuits, and can yield strong results. See e.g., Anita
Bernstein, Subverting the Marriage-Amendment Crusade with Law and Policy Reform, 24 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 79 (2007) (offering alternative strategies congruent with the quest for same-sex
marriage); Anita Bernstein & Joseph Bernstein, An Information Prescription for Drug
Regulation, 54 BUFF. L. REv. 569 (2006) (outlining techniques to extract post-marketing
information about prescription drugs).
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other consideration to lay runners. 3 ' Sensible regulation would
recognize that because lawyers' offers to represent lay individuals
can be both good and bad for the public, they warrant a more
nuanced response than the mix of condoning and condemning
reported in the Appendix to this Article.
138. In conversation with me following the oral portion of this Symposium, John Fabian Witt
advocated persuasively for a modification of the bans on fee splitting and the paying of referral
fees, arguing that only these more drastic reforms can give low-income individuals any hope of
obtaining legal counsel for a multitude of their needs. Interview with John Fabian Witt, Professor
of Law & History, Columbia Law Sch., in L.A., Cal. (Jan. 2008). 1 agree that if the problem is
access to legal services, my modest (and amply precedented) suggestions do not go far enough.
This large problem is, however, beyond the reach of this Article, which seeks to ameliorate the
smaller ills of hypocrisy and lack of transparency.
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Appendix: Instances of Discipline for Solicitation
Reported to the Public, 2002-2007
In this five-year period, more than half (i.e., twenty-six) of U.S.
jurisdictions reported no instances of discipline for solicitation. The
reports are noted below with case citations if citations are available,
and URLs if not.
ALABAMA
1. Elizabeth V. Addison, ASB 06-24(A) (Ala. State Bar
Apr. 6, 2007),
http://www.alabar.org/bbc/minutes/0407/April6_Board_
Meeting.pdf (worse behavior).
2. Henry Dailey, Jr., ASB 04-292(A) (Ala. State Bar May
19, 2006),
http://www.alabar.org/bbc/minutes/0506/2006 ,May_ 9
_BoardMeeting.pdf (technical violations).
3. Angela Leigh Daniel, ASB 04-166(A) (Ala State Bar
Dec., 8, 2006),
http://www.alabar.org/bbc/minutes/1 206/BoardMeeting
_MinutesDecember_8,2006.pdf (technical violations).
ARKANSAS
4. Sheila F. Campbell, CPC No. 2003-179 (Sup. Ct. Comm.
Prof I Conduct 2004),
http://courts.state.ar.us/opc/20040226/2003-1 79.htm
(prior record, technical violations).
5. S. Gene Cauley, CPC No. 2003-157 (Sup. Ct. Comm.
Prof I Conduct 2004),
http://courts.state.ar.us/opc/20040610/2003-157.htm
(technical violations).
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6. Michael E. Crawley, CPC No. 2005-153 (Sup. Ct.
Comm. Prof 1 Conduct 2006),
http://courts.state.ar.us/opc/20060302/2005-153.html
(technical violations).
7. George Michael Deloache, CPC No. 2005-156 (Sup. Ct.
Comm. Prof I Conduct 2006),
http://courts.state.ar.us/opc/20060302/2005-15 6.html
(technical violations).
8. William Bruce Leasure, CPC No. 2001-143 (Sup. Ct.
Comm. Prof'l Conduct 2002),
http://courts.state.ar.us/opc/20020606/200 1-143.htm
(hirelings).
9. Jean M. Madden, CPC No. 2004-023 (Sup. Ct. Comm.
Prof I Conduct 2004),
http://courts.state.ar.us/opc/20040701/2004-023.htm
(prior record, technical violations).
10. Lori A. Mosby, CPC No. 2002-151 (Sup. Ct. Comm.
Prof 1 Conduct 2003),
http://courts.state.ar.us/opc/200307 10/2002-151 .htm
(prior record, technical violations).
11. Michael Anthony Price, CPC No. 2002-087 (Sup. Ct.
Comm. Prof 1 Conduct 2002),
http://courts.state.ar.us/opc/20021107/2002-087.htm
(worse behavior, prior record, hirelings).
ARIZONA
12. In re Lamm, DC No. 01-1570 (Disciplinary Comm'n
Mar. 26, 2003),
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/dc/Matrix/2003_MatrixF
INAL.pdf (worse behavior).
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COLORADO
13. People v. Cozier, 74 P.3d 531 (Colo. O.P.D.J 2003)
(worse behavior, prior record).
FLORIDA
14. The Florida Bar v. Barrett, 897 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 2005)
(worse behavior, hirelings).
15. The Florida Bar v. Gold, 937 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 2006)
(worse behavior).
GEORGIA
16. In re McElroy, 281 Ga. 317 (Ga. 2006) (either sui
generis or hirelings) (see note 87 and accompanying
text).
ILLINOIS
17. In re Dombrowski, No. 01 CH57 (Attorney Registration
& Disciplinary Comm'n Jan. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.iardc.org/rd database/rulesdecisions.html
(type "Dombrowski" in the "Respondent Information"
field and then click "submit") (worse behavior, prior
record, hirelings).
18. In re Griffin, No. 02 CH 41 (Attorney Registration &
Disciplinary Comm'n May 22, 2003), available at
http://www.iardc.org/rd-database/rulesdecisions.html
(type "Griffin" in the "Respondent Information" field
and then click "submit") (worse behavior, prior record).
19. In re Harrison, No. 02 CH 84 (Attorney Registration &
Disciplinary Comm'n Mar. 15, 2004), available at
http://www.iardc.org/rdLdatabase/rulesdecisions.html
(type "Harrison" in the "Respondent Information" field
and then click "submit") (worse behavior).
20. In re Milks, No. 99 CH 20 (Attorney Registration &
Disciplinary Comm'n Nov. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.iardc.org/rd-database/rulesdecisions.html
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(type "Milks" in the "Respondent Information" field and
then click "submit") (worse behavior, hirelings).
21. In re Rojek, No. 2367971, 01 CH 38 (111. Mar. 13, 2002)
(IARDC Database), available at
http://www.iardc.org/rddatabase/rulesdecisions.html
(type "Rojek" in the "Respondent Information" field and
then click "submit") (worse behavior, hirelings).
22. In re Shefler, No. 3127682, 05 CH 35 (Ill. July 19, 2007)
(IARDC Database), available at
http://www.iardc.org/rddatabase/rulesdecisions.html
(type "Shefler" in the "Respondent Information" field
and then click "submit") (worse behavior).
23. In re Smith, No. 6203411, 02 CH 53 (Ill. Sept. 19, 2003)
(IARDC Database), available at
http://www.iardc.org/rddatabase/rulesdecisions.html
(type "Smith" in the "Respondent Information" field and
then click "submit") (worse behavior).
24. In re Thomas, No. 6197708, 05 CH 85 (Ill. Nov. 1,
2006) (IARDC Database), available at
http://www.iardc.org/rd database/rulesdecisions.html
(type "Thomas" in the "Respondent Information" field
and then click "submit") (worse behavior, prior record).
25. In re Vajdik, No. 6210308, 01 CH 121 (Ill. Jan. 23,
2003) (IARDC Database), available at
http://www.iardc.org/rddatabase/rulesdecisions.html
(type "Vajdik" in the "Respondent Information" field
and then click "submit") (worse behavior, hirelings).
26. In re Whiting, No. 6230517, 02 CH 23 (Ill. Jan. 23,
2003) (IARDC Database), available at
http://www.iardc.org/rd_database/rulesdecisions.html
(type "Whiting" in the "Respondent Information" field
and then click "submit").
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INDIANA
27. In re Allen, 770 N.E.2d 826 (Ind. 2002) (technical
violation).
28. In re Coale, 775 N.E.2d 1079 (Ind. 2002) (worse
behavior).
29. In re Milks, 810 N.E.2d 719 (Ind. 2004) (worse
behavior, hirelings).
IOWA
30. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att'y Disciplinary Bd. V. Bjorklund, 725
N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2006) (worse behavior, prior record).
31. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att'y Disciplinary Bd. V. Johnston, 732
N.W.2d 448 (Iowa 2007) (worse behavior, prior record).
KENTUCKY
32. Howes v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 214 S.W.3d 319 (Ky. 2007)
(worse behavior, prior record).
33. Martin v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 214 S.W.3d 322 (Ky. 2007)
(prior record).
LOUISIANA
34. In re Broome, 815 So. 2d 1 (La. 2002) (worse behavior,
prior record).
35. In re Gibson, 856 So. 2d 1173 (La. 2003) (worse
behavior, prior record).
36. In re Hackman, 833 So. 2d 916 (La. 2002) (prior record,
hirelings).
37. In re Jones, 952 So. 2d 673 (La. 2007) (worse behavior).
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MASSACHUSETTS i
38. Admonition No. 04-44 (2004),
http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/admon2004.htm (worse
behavior).
39. Admonition No. 05-25 (2005),
http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/admon2005.htm (worse
behavior).
MICHIGAN
40. Felt, No. 01-163-GA (June 20, 2002),
http://www.adbmich.org/coveo/notices/2002-06-20-0 in-
163.pdf (hirelings).
MISSISSIPPI
41. Miss. Bar v. Turnage, 919 So. 2d 36 (Miss. 2005) (worse
behavior, hirelings).
MINNESOTA
42. In re Dehen, 721 N.W.2d 607 (Minn. 2006) (technical
violations).
NORTH CAROLINA
43. Lawrence J. Kissling, III, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Dec. 2006)
Reprimands,
http://www.ncbar.gov/discipline/actions.asp?page= l &ke
ywords=kissling (technical violations).
44. Stafford, Greg, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall 2003) Reprimands,
http://www.ncbar.gov/discipline/actions.asp?page= 1 &ke
ywords=stafford (technical violations).
NEW JERSEY
45. In re De Laurentis, 796 A.2d 223 (N.J. 2002) (worse
behavior).
46. Jay Edelstein, Disciplinary Summaries at 57,
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/oae/OAEDisciplinarySu
mmaries 1 990-2006.pdf (2003) (technical violations).
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NEW YORK
47. In re Shapiro, 780 N.Y.S.2d 680 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
(worse behavior, prior record).
48. In re Weinstein, 772 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y. App. Div.
2004) (worse behavior).
49. Raymond H. Wong PC v. Xue. 233 N.Y.L.J. 24 (2005)
(non-disciplinary [injunction against solicitation])."
OHIO
50. Akron Bar Ass'n v. Amourgis, 862 N.E.2d 501 (Ohio
2007) (worse behavior, hirelings).
51. Butler County Bar Ass'n v. McKenzie, 772 N.E.2d 636
(Ohio 2002) (technical violations, hirelings).
52. Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Moreland, 780 N.E.2d 579 (Ohio
2002) (worse behavior, hirelings).
OREGON
53. Damian M. Idiart, OSB No. 01061, Or. State Bar
Bulletin, Public Reprimand (Dec. 2005),
https://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/05dec/discip
line.html (hirelings).
TENNESSEE
54. Larry Fitzgerald, No. 10953 (2003),
http://www.tbpr.org/NewsAndPublications/Releases/Pdf
s/010953-20031024.pdf (worse behavior, prior record).
55. Robert L. Martin, No. 18106 (2005),
http://www.tbpr.org/NewsAndPublications/Releases/Pdf
s/martin%2027525-5%20re1632453584251542420.pdf
(technical violations).
TEXAS
56. Geronimo Delarosa, No. 05648700 (2003),
http://www.texasbar.com/Content/ContentGroups/Public
ations3/Journal/2003/November/Discipline.htm (worse
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behavior).
57. Alberto Huerta, No. 10177500 (2006),
http://www.texasbar.com/Content/ContentGroups/Public
ations3/Journal/2006 1/December5/Disc%2OActs%2ODec
%202006.PDF (worse behavior).
58. Jerome K Wade, No. 20633700 (2003),
http://www.texasbar.com/Content/ContentGroups/Public
ations3/Journal/20041/April3/DisciplinaryActions.htm
(worse behavior).
VERMONTi
59. Anonymous, No. 2002.214 (2002),
http://dol.state.vt.us/gopherroot4/prof conductbd/38.p
rb (technical violations).*
WISCONSIN
60. In re Whiting, 667 N.W.2d 355 (Wis. 2003).
WEST VIRGINIA
61. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Lakin, 617 S.E.2d 484 (W.
Va. 2005) (worse behavior).
i. Admonitions in Massachusetts and Vermont are classified as nonpublic. See Mass.gov,
How to File a Complaint, http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/complaint.htm; Vermontiudiciary.org,
Permanent Rules Governing Establishment and Operation of the Professional Responsibility
Program,
http://www.vermontjudiciary.org/Coimmittees/prbrules/prbao9.htm#Types%2 /o/2OSanctions.
However, because these were mentioned in reports accessible to the public-albeit with the
attorneys' names omitted-they are included here. Omitting them would of course reduce the
total of sixty-two to fifty-nine and raise the total number of jurisdictions that issued no public
sanctions for solicitation in the five-year period from twenty-six to twenty-eight.
ii. In this decision, Mr. Xue received pointed criticism from the New York court for his
solicitation, which may also be tantamount to a public reprimand that was not an instance of
discipline.
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